Yet another supply chain attack has surfaced, this time using the xrpl library to sneak through malicious packages. 

 is recognised as the recommended npm library for integrating the 

 with JavaScript/TypeScript applications, and has over 140k downloads a week.

Our security team quickly responded to this threat and found that no Cloudsmith customers are currently using any of the affected versions.

The attack strategy was to introduce five suspect versions of the library, masquerading as genuine releases. They inserted a crypto-stealing backdoor by adding malicious code that could leak private keys and silently sign fraudulent transactions.

npmjs have recently released version 4.2.5, which overrides the compromised versions.

You can get a full and detailed description of the attack from Charlie Eriksen at 

XRP supply chain attack: Official NPM package infected with crypto stealing backdoor.

The vulnerability is logged with the CVE Dictionary Entry of 

XRPL Dependencies - A Critical Security Risk

The XRPL is a Layer 1 blockchain built for payments and asset transfers. Layer 1 blockchain is the foundational infrastructure of a blockchain. This is where core functions are handled, such as validating transactions, securing the network, and ensuring consensus around transactions and ownership.

The XRPL is used by financial institutions, fintech companies, developers, and startups, mostly for payments, asset tokenization, and building lightweight financial applications.

A supply chain attack on a package integrating with the XRPL can have serious implications. It could expose private keys, hijack transactions, or leak sensitive data, without compromising the ledger itself. If xrpl.js is compromised, any apps using it could unknowingly sign malicious transactions or leak user information, which could result in stolen funds. XRPL dependencies are critical to security.

Any security features can and should be tested against real-world threats. Cloudsmith’s Enterprise Policy Management (EPM) includes policy-as-code, meaning custom policies can be written against precise requirements to block known exploits.

For the xrpl.js attack, we know the bogus versions, so it’s easy to write Rego code that checks your repository against the known versions. Cloudsmith can then quarantine the packages if there’s a match against npm packages named xrpl:

For more information on setting up and configuring policy code, see 

Enterprise Policy Management Example: Quarantine Packages Using Policy as Code

 of Cloudsmith and see how it can stop supply chain attacks.

Cloudsmith blog

XRPL Supply Chain Attack and How to Block it Using Cloudsmith’s Enterprise Policy Management